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Manufacturing Capital 01
The relationship between manufacturing capital and the policies
of the post-war apartheid state has become a focal point of contention
in debates between "conventional" and "revisionist" analyses. A
growing corpus of literature from both camps now recognises that
organised mining and agricultural capital collaborated, both before and
after the war, in establishing many of the institutions of labour and
political control today associated with apartheid. But accounts
diverge widely when it comes to the role of manufacturing capital.
Liberals have conventionally viewed the interests of
manufacturing with its frequent demand for semi-skilled, settled,
occupationally and geographically mobile labour, and for an expanded
domestic market, as incompatible with the restrictive and coercive
labour regime of apartheid. Marxist writers of the early 1970s
challenged this orthodox view, arguing that apartheid played a
functional and supportive role in South Africa's generally impressive
record of post-war industrial growth.
More recently, Greenberg and Lipton have argued that
manufacturing capital has little vested interest in post-war structures
of racial domination. Lipton, reasserting the old liberal orthodoxy,
argues that secondary industry actively opposed apartheid; Greenberg
portrays industry as passively conforming to its strictures.
The following study of struggles between capital and the state
over industrial decentralisation policy since World War II takes issue
with these various accounts. Many Marxist writings of the 1970s tended
to derive political relations from economic structures in a reductionist
way, focus on objective connections to the exclusion of active struggles
of social agents and, in a functionalist manner, assumed an almost
entirely supportive and non-contradictory relationship between racial
domination and capitalist interests.
By contrast, Greenberg and Lipton conceptually respect politics
and the state as entities in their own right, closely scrutinise the
interaction of distinctive class and state actors, and illuminate the
tensions in the relationship between capital and the state. But they go
to an opposite extreme, viewing the "racial state apparatus" as having
become an entirely autonomous and all-powerful entity to whose dictates
capital conforms with little protest (Greenberg) or against whose
actions it protests with relatively little success (Lipton).
My own account shares Greenberg and Lipton's concern to
concretely analyse the struggles between capital and the state over
policy, rather than deriving their relationship from an imputed "logic
of capital" or assuming the state to be a simple instrument or
expression of capitalist interests.
But I dissent from key aspects of Greenberg and Lipton's
portrayal of the apartheid state. Whereas they see it as operating with
little concern for manufacturing capitalist interests, and the
capitalist class as generally powerless to impose its will on the state,
my own account presents the apartheid state as itself compromising
repeatedly to accommodate itself to the interests of manufacturing
capital. Organised capital may not govern, but it is neither passive
nor powerless in relation to the apartheid state; accommodation runs
both ways, and not only, as Greenberg sometimes seem to imply, from
capital to the state. And, contra Lipton, there is rarely any sustained
radical variance of interests between manufacturing capital and the
state's projects. Industry may not formulate policy, and policies may
not originate in an explicit desire to advance industrial capitalist
interests. But, in the course of its efforts to accommodate capital,
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the state has had to tailor and modify many of its policies to address
manufacturing capital's demands. The relationship between state and
capital is a tense one, fraught with conflict and attrition, but the
pressures of mutual accommodation typically prevail er the temptations
of all-out war.
Moreover - and in contrast to both Lip ton and Greenberg - I do
not see organised industry as purely external to the post-war apartheid
state. On the contrary, the following study of capital's relationship
to industrial decentralisation will show that organised industry has
increasingly been directly present in important state structures from
roughly 1960 onwards, thus both extending its access to policymakers and
strengthening its behind-the-scenes bargaining power vis-a-vis those in
the commanding heights of the state. This capitalist insertion in the
state's "economic apparatus" is, as Poulantzas suggested, the
counterpart of the modern state's intervention in the sphere of the
economy, and bears a number of resemblances to "corporatist"
arrangements in Western Europe capitalist states.
Finally, this paper argues against treating either capital or
the state as homogeneous.Not only is capital divided between different
scales and sectors and political allegiances, but - importantly for the
purposes of this paper - along regional lines. These fissures express
themselves in tensions between the attempts of organised industry and
commerce to represent the views of "capital-in-general" and the de facto
positions and behaviour of distinctive aggregates of capital (or
individual capitalists). The state, which attempts to exploit these
divisions, is itself an amalgam of often quite distinctive policies and
priorities. These distinctions often manifest themselves in
inter-departmental struggles; and white internal state conflicts cannot
be seen simply as a "condensation" of broader class struggles, these is
little doubt that organised capital has sought to play departments off
against each other, or that it has found some branches of the state more
receptive to its concerns than others. It should be stressed, however,
that these fractures do not prevent a predominant "line" from emerging
in either quarter - whether from organised capital or the state; it is
the balance of forces internal to each which determines the line that
most insistently or publicly prevails.
Drawing selectively on writers like Offe, Block and the later
(1983) Miliband, I view the state and the dominant class in capitalist
societies as "different, separate forces"; the state managers have
their own specific self-interests and spheres of concern; they are
neither instruments of capital nor bearers of objective capitalist
relations. Nonetheless their institutional self-interest (as people
wishing to retain power, live off politics, advance the "national" or
some other broad "interest", maintain popular support and legitimacy, )
obliges them, under normal circumstances, to maintain and promote the
private accumulation process. This in turn requires that they preserve
business "confidence". The state develops an interest in observing
certain of what former FCI president Leo Borman has termed "terms of
truce" between state and capital: the terms being that it foster
"sustained growth" in a "self-regulating free enterprise economy".
This "free enterprise" economy is, by definition, an economy
which the state can neither directly order nor control, an economy in
which capitalists retain authority over the bulk of production and
investment decisions, and in which the state can only influence capital
by manipulating variables (fiscal and monetary conditions, incentives
and disincentives) external to the capitalist enterprise itself.
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Paradoxically, however, the state, by thus respecting capital's
autonomy, perpetuates its own vulnerability to threats of investment
strikes or flights, boycotts and other forms of disruption by a dominant
economic class whose individual members are typically guided by
shorter-term profit considerations than those of state planners. It is
in the context of this paradox that we need to locate both the
fallibility of state economic management in capitalist societies like
South Africa and the tense but mutual accommodation between state and
capital to which we earlier referred.
II
The industrial decentralisation policy of the South African
state - and, more especially, its functionality vis-a-vis capital and
capitalism - has recently become the subject of considerable debate.
On the Marxist side, writers like Wolpe, Legassick and Lacey
have presented these policies as economically functional to capital. For
Wolpe, they serve as "an alternative to migration as a mechanism for
producing cheap labour power"; for Legassick they are complementary to
the apartheid state's promotion of capital-intensive capitalist growth
in "white" industrial centres; while Lacey suggests the policies have
opened opportunities for a section of manufacturing capital to
restructure itself around ultra-cheap labour. Trevor Bell, a
non-Marxist, has, for his part, argued that certain labour-intensive
industries have been spontaneously decentralising to escape
international competition and urban union pressure, especially since the
late 1960s, and that state-provided incentives are thus reinforcing
(even over-subsidising) capital's own endogenous tendencies. Another
group of radical writers, Zille and Hirsch, have interpreted
decentralisation policies as part of an attempt by the state to
guarantee, not the economic, but political, conditions of capitalist
reproduction, in the former case by generating the demographic basis for
divisive ethnic cleavages in society, in the latter case by shoring up
homelands-based elites running out of resources for political patronage.
On the other side have been writers like Tomlinson and
Addleson, and Lipton, who disagree that industrial decentralisation
serves capitalist interests. The former have attempted to cast doubt on
Bell's argument concerning spontaneous decentralisation, arguing, along
with, for example, Rogerson, that state restrictions and incentives,
rather than tendencies inherent in capital, account for the industrial
decentralisation that has taken place. For Lipton decentralisation is a
"strategem" for making workable an apartheid policy framework that runs
conter to capitalist interests, and the policy itself imposes more costs
on manufacturing capital than it provides benefits.
The arguments and evidence marshalled by these writers ranges
from abstract theoretical demonstrations to analyses of job creation and
output trends in manufacturing. Only Lipton, to my knowledge, has
looked at organised industry and commerce's reactions to, inputs into,
and struggles over the state's decentralisation policy. She concludes,
as we have indicated, that organised manufacturing and commerce have
consistently opposed the state's attempts to redirect manufacturing
investment to outlying growth points. The evidence she uses is,
however, quite selective, and the end result is a one-sided picture.
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Our own argument, based on a wider reading of evidence, is as
follows:
1. Decentralisation policy was par excellance the terrain on which the
state sought to reconcile tensions and differences between the
priorities of apartheid planners and those of manufacturing
capital. In one respect it had a similar function to migrant
labour policy: it was intended to give capitalists access to black
labour without compromising the apartheid goal of freezing and/or
reducing permanent black settlement in white-designated parts of
South Africa. But, unlike migrant labour, decentralisation offered
industry access to a settled, potentially trainable and
occupationally mobile, labour force; and moreoever, a labour force
that would be ultra-cheap and, policymakers assumed, politically
quiescent.
2. Organised industry - or at least the bulk of it - would have
preferred a policy formula that allowed for a gradual extension of
the vertical and horizontal mobility of black labour in
white-designated areas, and for this reason sought an amelioration
of job reservations and influx control. Similarly, it was critical
of various costs that it believed industrial decentralisation
imposed on metropolitan-based manufacturing capitals. The
"compromise" represented by both decentralisation and migrant
labour - insofar as both sought to guarantee capitalist access to
black labour supplies in a framework of apartheid - was therefore
not on organised industry's chosen terms.
3. Nonetheless - and in large measure because of the state's pragmatic
implementation of its policy and its desire to appease organised
industry - state and capital were able to forge a series of
accommodations and compromises in the area of industrial
decentralisation which were far from intolerable from organised
industry's point of view. On the contrary, organised industry
increasingly was drawn into the logic of decentralisation,
demanding more and better incentives over wider areas, and
participating in the programme's implementation to a growing extent
from 1960 onwards. Indeed, organised industry (and commerce) used
decentralisation as a lever for influencing economic policy and
increasing its access to, and penetration of, the state's economic
planning machinery. Moreover, all the evidence suggests that, with
the exception of a period lasting from roughly 1967 through to
1971, organised indsutry's level of acceptance of, and immersion
in, the industrial decentralisation programme tended to grow,
rather than recede, over the years.
4. Industrial decentralisation policies generated an endemic tendency
towards disunity within both industry and commerce, and both
battled to find a unified line on the subject in the face of the
state's "divide-and-rule" tactics. It is well known that the
Afrikaner Handelsinstituut has generally (though not always) given
active support to industrial decentralisation. But the lines of
fracture were not exclusively between English and Afrikaner
business. On the contrary: there were persistent and deep
divisions within both the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI) and
the Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom), principally
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along regional lines. There was also constant enmity between
industry's critics of decentralisation and certain prominent
capitalists who took advantage of it. Finally there were tensions
between established metropolitan-based industrialists and the large
and growing number of (usually small and emerging) individual
capitals who exploited decentralisation opportunities.
Ill
We shall begin by looking historically at the evolving
relationship between organised capital and decentralisation policy.
The historical section takes off with the 1930s - that is, the
pre-apartheid - period. This is useful because it tells us something
about the continuities and discontinuities between 'segregation' and
'apartheid'. Secondly, though this paper is principally about the
relationship of manufacturing capital to the state, it also looks at
Assocom. The justification for this is twofold. Firstly, Assocom
represents a large number of industrial concerns both in the
metropolitan areas and in many outlying towns. Secondly, commerce,
unlike agriculture or mining, is a relatively spatially mobile sector,
and has come to share with industry a profound interest in the policy of
industrial decentralisation. On a number of occasions it has forged a
common position with the FCI (and AHI), and, like industry, it has been
regarded by many liberal commentators as a source of continuous
opposition to apartheid economic policies.
1935 - 1950
In the 1930s and 1940s, when state-promoted industrial
decentralisation was first mooted, organised industry's attitude was one
of caution: it affirmed the centrality of market factors in determining
the location of industry, expressed relief at the narrow brief of the
Rural Industries commission, set up in 1936, and advised a circumspect
approach on the question of rural-urban wage differentiation. Assocom,
partly because of the weight of its strong small-centre representation,
passed a resolution in 1935 urging the government to gixe its fullest
attention to promoting industry in small inland towns, and in 1938
urged that low-interest loans be granted to industries in country
towns. At other times Assocom expressed clear reservations about the
promotion of rural industries.
Organised industry and commerce also supported moves to set up
a state financing and planning machinery to .assist, rationalise and
co-ordinate post-war industrial development, and this machinery
(notably the IDC set up in 1940, the SEPC established in 1942) clearly
included industrial decentralisation in its purview. However, commerce,
in particular, soon became critical of the confused role of the SEPC and
of the IDC| T S interference in the process of inter-capitalist
competition. Assocom members also initially worried about the
potentially wide powers and functions of the Natural Resources
Development Council, set up in 1947, to promote regional development,
although many of its fears were subsequently allayed.
During this period industrial decentralisation proposals were
largely a response to the demands of organised lobbies in stagnant white
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country towns. From 1940 onwards they also gave vent to the
technocratic concerns that achieved resonance in the Smuts
Administration during the war years. Although some limited attention
was given in this period to the idea of reserve industrialisation, this
issue was still secondary. The absence of any overt linkage of
regional development to large-scale politically-inspired demographic
engineering (of the type proposed in the 1950s), and the Smuts
government's cautious and technicist approach to industrial
decentralisation, kept the conflict between state and capital over the
location of industry to a minimum during these years.
1951 - 1960
Around 1951 the NP government made clear its intention to
promote black industries in the reserves, and white industries on the
borders of the reserves, as part of its plans for territorial
segregation. The metropolitan-dominated commanding heights of organised
industry reacted in a nervous and generally hostile way. Organised
industry and commerce met Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, in
1951, to express their anxieties about - amongst other things - the
possibility of direct state controls on industrial location and the
prospects of unfair competition from decentralised industries. The FCI
stressed the need for full consultation of industry. The government
side denied any intention to impose compulsory location and assured
industry that it would not proceed too hastily in implementing its
plans. It further indicated that black industries in the reserves would
be controlled by state capital and would not initially be allowed to
advance beyond home-craft products into spheres where they could
challenge established industries.
In 1953 industry was invited to submit recommendations to the
Tomlinson Commission, and took this opportunity to voice a wide range of
objections to the idea of large-scale industrial decentralisation. It
cited, amongst many other things, the threat of unfair competition and
increased taxation to finance decentralisation, the unsuitability of the
reserves to anything going beyond agricultural rehabilitation, and the
problems associated with the state acting directly as an entrepreneur in
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the reserves.
In 1956 the government prepared its white paper on the
Tomlinson Report against a background of growing business uncertainty
about the future of the Rand. The FCI's response was generally an
unhappy one, and it reiterated many of its earlier objections. Citing a
"national responsibility" to ensure that no harm came to established
industry, the FCI called for urgent consultation over future government
18
moves.
In a 1957 interview with Verwoerd, the Minister of Native
Affairs went out of his way to stress his pragmatic intentions:
established industries, he assured the FCI, would not be curtailed in
the forseeable future and decentralisation points would be sited in
economically viable locations. Decentralisation, Verwoerd argued, would
also lower black housing costs, increase black purchasing power and
occupational- mobility in outlying areas and foster black political
quiescence. Later an FCI official reported that, despite continuing
reservations, a "basis of understanding" had been reached with the
Minister. The FCI drew further comfort from the generally mild
recommendations on industrial decentralisation contained in the 1958
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Viljoen Commission's report, and from further official reassurances.
But the predominant tone remained one of anxiety and in 1959 the FCI
issued:
a grave warning against artificial and forced development of
industries in particular areas involving discrimination
against existing industries and the conduct of J^armful and
expensive experiments in industrial development.
It is clear that FCI's anxiety at this time was reinforced by a general
slowdown in economic growth - in manufacturing in particular - after
1955. The clothing and footwear industries, highly vulnerable to
undercutting by industries in uncontrolled areas, suffered especially
severely at this time. Established industry feared that an expensive
decentralisation programme and the accompanying unfair competition would
further damage its prosngcts, and an atmosphere of uncertainty invaded
business decisionmaking. On the other hand, the FCI was ready to do a
swop: if the government made moves to reflate the economy and to
consult it more closely, it would be more willing to participate in the
decentralisation scheme.
It should be noted that Assocom's predominant tone during the
1950s was generally more ambivalent than FCI's: some representatives ,pf
the organisation favoured decentralisation, and others opposed it.
The organisation's submission to the Tomlinson Commission seemed quite
enthusiastic about state-assisted decentralisation of certain kinds of
industries, subject to certain (not especially demanding) conditions,
and denied that decentralised industries posed a competitive threat to
established industries. An editorial in Commercial Opinion went still
further after the Tomlinson Commission reported:
[It] is not necessary to hold any particular political
doctrine in order to see the advantages of setting in train
a series of regional development programmes to increase the
productivity of backward areas [and] a good case could
probably be made out in favour of adopting the Tomlinson
Commission's economic proposals even if the total planned
expenditure of over £100 million for the first ten years was
unlikely to give any material return ... In fact, the
Tomlinson Commission holds out the prospect of considerable
economic returns on the investment and, in the light of
this, action becomes mandatory.
Assocom also made repeated calls for promotion of white investment
inside the reserves and in platteland towns. On the other hand,
Assocom joined FCI in worrying about potentially high costs, unviable
schemes and the possibility£>f compulsion. Its level of apprehension
rose as the decade closed,, and in 1959 it approvingly underlined the
FCI's own hostile stance.
1960 - 1966
Relations between organised capital and state officials
deteriorated rapidly in the crisis-ridden afatermath of the Sharpeville
massacre, and this antagonism rubbed off into negotiations about
industrial decentralisation. The commencement of the border industry
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scheme in 1960 was greeted by organised industry in a bitterly hostile
way against a backdrop of capitalist calls for deracialising the
economy* But organised industry and commerce did gain access to state
policymakers through the setting up of the Economic Advisory Council
which they used to press for growth-oriented economic policies as a quid
pro quo for accepting decentralisation.
The subsequent success of state repression of the popular
movement and other factors in triggering off the great boom of the 1960s
did not silence but it certainly muffled the chorus of capitalist
criticism of the border industry scheme. Not only did accelerated
growth make decentralisation more affordable, but
capital also quickly discovered that the state had no intention of
bringing about decentralisation on the "vast and revolutionary11 scale
feared by men like Harry Oppenheimer. Accepting that a "conscious
policy of decentralisation is inevitable", organised industry busied
itself with trying to ensure that it was implemented with the minimum f
"industrial and social disruption", principally through a limited
number of controlled and "scientific" border industry experiements.
Until the late 1960s the state undertook nothing more than limited
initiatives of precisely this kind: it concentrated its attention on
directing industrial overspill to well placed industrial satellite
centres like Hammarsdale, Rosslyn and Pietermaritzburg.
As for Assocom, its stance during this period was ambiguous but
on the whole it was far from hostile to industrial decentralisation.
Nonetheless the rapid growth of the economy far outran the growth of
border industries during the 1960s and this, together with crystallising
plans for launching bantustans on the road to "independence", generated
in the government a new sense of urgency about the need to accelerate
decentralisation. Existing border industry schemes showed no sign of
being able to arrest long-term pressures for urbanisation in "white "
South Africa, let alone reverse the flow of black migration. In
addition, bantustan political elites, essential to social control,
desperately needed new economic resources to shore up their powers of
patronage in conditions of growing overcrowding and socio-economic
breakdown. The government thus decided to resort to compulsory controls
on location to force the pace of decentralisation. This culminated in
the enactment of the Physical Planning Act in 1967.
1967 - 1971
Over the years organised industry and commerce had repeatedly
stressed their intense opposition to any direct government controls over
the establishment and expansion of industries in the metropolitan areas.
Not surprisingly, then^ they reacted with bitter hostility to the
Physical Planning Act. D.G. Paxton of the Johannesburg Changer of
Commerce called it "the most drastic control to be introduced into South
Africa in times of peace". The FCI complained that the Act "makes
illegal all natural and normal expansion in industry": this forced
industry "either to lose the spontaneity of its development, to act
illegally or to invite corruption"; further, it "robbed" the
industrialist of his "initiative". Later it described the Act and
similar legislation as an "administrative and legal straitjacket"
designed to "throttle and intimidate industrial enterprise".
FCI and Assocom responded to the introduction of the
legislation in Parliament by issuing dire threats in a series of
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meetings with government ministers. They warned of all sorts of
consequences unless the Act was completely withdrawn. The Act would,
they said, generate uncertainty, aggravate labour shortages, bolster
inflation and lead to economic stagnation; it would raise costs and
impair the competitive ability of industry overseas; it would give
ministers "absolute" powers and mire enterprises in bureaucratic red
tape. Industry and commerce went a step further: they threatened to
stage an outright investment strike. The FCI threatened that
industrialists may decide "they will not invest at all" instad of
investing where the government wants them to; this could even lead to
"disinvestment". An editorial in Commercial Opinion echoed this
threat.
The FCI and Assocom also agitated for redress in parliament,
presenting it with a position paper during the 1967 session. The paper
attacked the arbitrary, fragmented and haphazard approach represented by
the Planning Act, as well as the prospects of bureaucratic proliferation
and ministerial favouritism it opened up. Industry's agitations
provoked an immense political row, culminating in a clash between
Oppenheimer and Planning Minister Karel de Wet shortly before the 1970
election. De Wet bluntly warned that unless Oppenheimer co-operated in
decentralising industry his requests jfor supplies of labour would be
considered in an unsympathetic light.
However, some subtle but important shifts in the political
tactics of organised industry did take place during this debate. As
soon as the Act was passed, FCI basically took the Act as given, at
least for a while, and turned its attention to influencing its
implementation. Judging it to be "useless and unwise" to "antagonise"
the government, the FCI considered going for a compromise that could
prise open cracks of uncertainty if perceived in the state itself. The
FCI also made pleas for closer consultation with state officials.
Nonetheless industry kept up the pressure on the state.
Indeed, it proceeded to carry out its threat of an investment strike.
While the Planning Act was by no means solely responsible for the first
economic slowdown after years of unprecedented boom, it undoubtedly
contributed - "directly or indirectly" - to the fall-off in new fixed
capital formation in the late 1960s. The Act generated both deep
uncertainty and, from 1969, exacerbated shortages of black labour -
reflected in high labout turnover, absenteeism and escalating wage
rates. Using this backdrop of economic difficulties to strengthn
their hand, industrialists began to make repeated calls for "practical
relief" from the provisions of the Act.
Panicked, the state in 1970 appointed an inter-departmental
committee of enquiry under Dr Riekert, chairman of the Economic Advisory
Council. The findings and subsequent white paper exempted certain
categories of industry and certain areas from the most onerous
provisions of the Physical Planning Act, pushed for exemptions from job
reservations in border and bantustan areas, and recommended an improved
package of decentralisation incentives to industrialists. At the same
time it reaffirmed the government's commitment to restricting employment
of Africans in certain metropolitan areas - most importantly the PWV -
and in this respect its main contribution was to clarify, rather than
ameliorate, officially declared policy. Nonetheless organised industry
responded to the findings with considerable enthusiasm.
"Much of industry' s thinking has been incorporated in the
document"; it had created an "atmosphere of negotiation" which could
lead to to a "workable system of decentralisation" and which had
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"already borne fruit in many problem areas". A later edition of the
FCI journal termed the white paper a "workmanlike" document and a "step
in the right direction", even if some uncertainties remained. FCI
director, D.C. Krogh, "welcomed" the "more realistic and businesslike
approach" promised by the white paper; subsequent consultations had
already resolved some outstanding uncertainties. In 1972 A.J. Jacobs,
secretary of the FCI Industrial Planning Committee, confirmed that the
white paper had removed many "uncertainties and negative aspects" of
industrial decentralisation policy.
1971 - 1978
The white paper marked a dramatic turning point in the
direction of greater mutual accommodation between organised industry and
decentralisation policymakers. A 1971 speech by IDC chairman J.J.
Kitshoff, acknowledged both the extent - and the limits - of FCI support
for decentralisation at that time:
I am aware ... that organised industry has expressed itself,
in principle, in support of the policy of decentralisation.
I am also aware that a growing number of industrialists are
involving themselves actively to give practical content to
this policy. This represents real progress ...
But he issued an appeal for more unambiguous backing:
In my view nothing is more likely to strengthen further the
close and cordial ties already existing between secondary
industry and the authorities than a public campaign, under
the FCI banner, to influence industrialists towards looking
at the homelands and the border areas for their growth and
expansion. As long as the FCI bugle sounds an uncertain
note, you can hardly blame the rank and file for being
hesitant to prepare themselves to meet the challenge.
But the FCI bugle was by now making sounds more and more pleasing to
government ears. Criticism of the Physical Planning Act continued, but
the overall tenor of industry's attitude to decentralisation became much
more positive.
Firstly, the FCI began publishing practial guidelines for
industrialists seeking to decentralise. Secondly, organised industry
and commerce set up thpir o w n committees to look into and assist
bantustan development. Noting the government's concern to gain
international acceptibility for separate development, FCI president H.C.
Morcombe gave his "support" to the "more balanced" post-Riekert
approach. "Industry is aware of the need to develop the homelands [and]
must be made to feel that the development of the homelands is a problem
directly of concern to it." A similar line was pushed during the
1970s by elements in organised commerce who stressed the importance of
business giving attention to "homeland development" at a time when
bantustan governments were devising development plans and embarking on
the road to political "independence".
Thirdly, co-operation and consultation between organised
business and the decentralisation policymakers increased markedly. The
FCI established "close contact" with personnel in the Board for
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Decentralisation of Industries, the New Industries Committee and the
Department of Planning. The 1971 white paper was itself in part a
reflection of closer business-government consultation, and in turn paved
the way for further collaboration. In 1972 FCI director Krogh noted
that the FCI "is increasingly being consulted by the authorities and has
also been invited to participate- more actively in the revision of ...
decentralisation . . . policies". In 1973 FCI president H.C. Morcombe
confirmed that "the voice of private enterprise is Jieing more heeded" in
the making of industrial decentralisation policy. M[T]he lesson of
co-operation between the private sector and government has had to be
learned", Morcombe observed in 1974.
A fourth and final index of this new spirit of accommodation to
decentralisation policies lay in organised industry's increasingly
persistent calls for bigger and more durable incentives and for more
adequate provision of infrastructure in growth points. Industry's
remarkable new will to play the game of "industrial decentralisation by
incentive" surfaced quietly in the shadow of the bitter dispute over the
Physical Planning Act. Until about 1967, the commanding heights of
organised industry had tended to view official incentives as too
expensive and as conferring unfair advantages on decentralised
industires. This began to change when, in its fight against the
coercive provisions of Section 3, organised industry began to draw a
contrast between pre- and post-1967 decentralisation policies in a way
that deliberately threw a favourable light on the former. Indeed, the
FCI happily proceeded to rewrite the entire history of its attitude to
decentralisation policy prior to 1967. The FCI told the Minister of
Planning that it endorsed the "broad policy of decentralisation of the
government as enunciated in the past". That same year, 1967, an FCI
official announced that his organisation was "in full agreement with
decentralisation provided there is no compulsion. Today we can even go
further by requesting an investigation why decentralisation has not
progressed as quickly as desired." The Transvaal Chamber of
Industry's J.D. Sweeney agreed that "there has never been any quarrel
with decentralisation" only over aspects of its implementation. The
FCI's 1973 guide described pre-1967 measures a "relatively minor" and
"voluntary".
What the FCI now began to call for was decentralisation based
on "more carrot" and "less stick" and, accordingly, it scrambled for
juicier carrots. Organised industry, in turn, grew more favourably
disposed to decentralisation policy as incentives expanded. In 1973,
for example, the FCI welcomed a new package of concessions in the
following way:
Organised industry's representations on the decentralisation
issue have been directed not unsuccessfully towards
smoothing the way for industrialists and having more
economic criteria applied to decentralisation incentives ...
The concessions . . . must be seen as an offer to
industrialists. This we welcome ...
By and large, therefore, industrialists must welcome the new
approach where the stick is mainly used to dangle a somewhat
juicier carrot in front of a mo^e willing horse - rather
than using it to flog the animal.
Likewise, in 1975 FCI president D.V. Benade, noting that incentives
announced in that year "to one extent or another agreed with proposals
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made by the Chamber", added that, "the FCI has become almost a partner
in national decision taking".
How do we explain the FCI's reconciliation with - even
conversion to - the logic of government decentralisation policy? A part
of the answer lies in the fact that officials never rigidly enforced the
Physical Planning Act; the overwhelming majority of applications for
African labour to facilitate the expansion or establishment of firms
were approved; and a negligible number of companies were prosecuted.
Only the clothing and textile industries felt any real blow. In this
respect, then, the government clearly backed down to accommodate
metropolitan industry - even if it retained the much disliked Section 3
on the statute books.
Secondly, there is the fact - noted above - that the government
increasingly began consulting organised industry over industrial
decentralisation, heeding many of its demands and, indeed, directly
drawing business into the formulation and implementation of
decentralisation policy. Thirdly, there is the improvement of official
incentives and their growing attractiveness to organised industry. More
research needs to be done before we can fully explain why, in the early
and mid 1970s, the commanding heights of organised industry jumped onto
the incentives bandwagon; why they came to view the incentives more in
terms of benefits than costs, and this, moreover, during a decade of
considerably slower growth than the previous one -
There is evidence that the call for improved incentives was
intially adopted on tactical grounds, in the hope of persuading the
government that it represented a prefferable option to bureaucratic
coercion. But the frequency and energetic conviction of these calls
over subsequent years amply illustrates that the new line represented
more than a transient tactical manoeuvre.
It seems probable that, as Bell has suggested, industry found
itself faced from the late 1960s by new competitive pressures from
overseas, especially in labour-intensive sectors like clothing and
textiles, and that this, coupled with intensifying black union pressure
from the mid-1970s onwards, convinced growing numbers of industrialists
of the competitive advantages of investing in state-subsidised,
cheap-labour endowed growth points. Slowing economic growth in the
main centres may, similarly, have caused many investors to see in
decentralisation an artificial shelter from economically hard times.
Decentralisation concessions represented, after all, a direct gift to
industrialists for whose subsidisation metropolitan industrialists were
not, in turn, expected to bear any disproportionate fiscal
responsibility. It may also be that production processes were becoming
progressively more disaggregatd with advancing mechanisation and
automation, creating more openings for branch plant investment in the
bantustans by established industries. This would allow firms to enjoy
the benefits of decentralisation without themselves having to relocate
immobile phases of their production process to the periphery. Survey
evidence clearly indicates the important part that branch plant
investment played - and plays - in overall decentralisation patterns.
There is also evidence that growth points have been attracting some
highly mechanised industries which have relocated their most deskilled
operations to decentralised areas. It seems likely that these trends
- coupled perhaps with the tighter labour market conditions generated by
the state's labour controls - combined to strengthen the attraction of
state-promoted "decentralisation by incentive" during the 1970s.
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1979 - 1984
The period from 1979 witnessed a still more earnest and
dedicated attempt by the state to directly involve the private sector in
planning and implementing regional development policies. Botha's
reformist administration sought to involve big business both in the
decentralisation programme itself and in the constitutional changes
1 inked to that programme. To make the regional progrmme attractive to
capital, the newly ascendant technocrats in the state - eventually
concentrated in the Department of Constitutional Development and
Planning - rationalised decentralisation policy in a variety of ways.
The explicitly "ideological" and "political" character of previous
industrial decentralisation policies gave way to an increasingly
technocratic official discourse and a more "functional" planning
approach.
Recommendations by the 1979 Riekert Commission resulted - after
several years of delays - in the abolition of Section 3 of the Physical
Planning Act (in 1985). Though never too severely enforced, Section 3
continued throughout the 1970s and early 1980s to be a consistent source
of capitalist disaffection, and metropolitan business, jnen, especially in
the PWV, had agitated relentlessly for its removal. Its abandonment
thus satisfies a key precondition for capitalist endorsement of the new
regional development plans.
In addition to the excision of such "negative" and coercive
measures, the post-1982 Good Hope plan offered massively pumped up
"positive" incentives for decentralisation, including boosted cash
concessions.
These carrots, Botha's constant entreaties for "teamwork" with
capital in advancing regional development, and the wider reformist
agenda to which decentralisation came to be linked, ensured that the new
development approach achieved a generally favourable reception from big
and organised capital. According to the official records of the Good
Hope conference of 1981, the FCI' s C.W.H. du Toit "welcomed the new
incentives for industrial decentralisation . . . which he described as
very exciting and of great interest to South African as well as overseas
entrepreneurs . .. Industrialists ... were very much aware that the
problems of unemployment and urbanisation were also theirs. The only
permanent solution lay in job creation in rural areas and the Black
national states." A.M. Rosholt, executive chairman of Barlow Rand,
after criticising pre-1982 approaches to industrial decentralisation,
stated the following:
Happily, the revised decentralisation policy, which has been
in operation since 1982, shows a stronger economic and less
ideological approach, and ... the policy - based as it is on
new and better-placed growth points - may well prove
sucessful. Then, too, the concessions presently offered are
more realistic.
when considered in conjunction with the lauching of the
Small Business Development Corporation and the Development
Bank, the new policy signals a welcome realism by the
government, and an acceptance by it of the vital role of
free enterprise. It is one which warrants our careful
consideration and attention.
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A cardinal feature of post-1979 development planning has been the
creation of "multi-lateral" bodies to co-ordinate planning between South
Africa and its supposedly independent homelands. Planning co-operation
between white and black designated parts of South Africa has also been
encouraged at regional and local levels through, for example, regional
liason committees and cross-border projects. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s the Botha agovernment hinted that this "economic
co-determination" could form the basis for an EEC-style co-operation
network embracing both "independent" homelands and neighbouring black
countries, or even the basis of a full blown political confederation.
Notwithstanding the clearly "neo-apartheid" character of these designs,
the FCI not only accepted but, through representations around 1§SO»
actively encouraged constitutional evolution in this direction.
Assocom did roughly the same some five years later. The central
concern of both was to find a political formula for South Africa
drastically reducing the "welfare" role of central government and
decentralising political power to regions and localities. This
"confederalism" or "federalism" would, the employer organisations hoped,
successfully co-opt the black majority into a constitutional framework
that bypassed the risks of majority rule in a unitary state and
preserved the capitalist system. Industrial decentralisation would in
turn provide - the interventions of FCI and Assocom recognised - a
crucial economic underpinning for such a dispensation by helping to
stabilise less developed regions.
For all its collaboration with government decentralisation
plans, organised industry and commerce have remained, at the end of the
day, cautious supporters of decentralisation, and in some instances have
been outrightly critical. While the state did a great deal to shape a
decentralisation package that would accommodate capital's demands and
doubts, they could not concede a policy formula entirely on capital's
terms. This, in turn, has left the way open to continued struggles
between organised capital and the state over the precise shape and
direction of official policy.
Two issues remain at the forefront of capital's continuing
dissatisfaction. One is the functioning of the Regional Development
Advisory Committees, which the FCI considers to have become bogged down
by inter-regional competition for state handouts, unclear definitions of
their role and relationship to other bodies, and by under-financing.
These difficulties had, it claimed, brought both regional development,
and the constitutional development premised on it, to a "crossroads".
The other issue - an object of still more intense and
unresolved struggles - is the state's plan to empower the new regional
services councils to impose payroll and turnover levies on businesses
under their jurisdiction. Officials have justified this as part of a
scheme to redistribute resources from wealthy white municipalities to
neighbouring fiscally-strapped black municipalities. Organised industry
and commerce, reluctant to pay out additional taxes, have argued that
the RSC levies are intended to serve as a disincentive to investing in
established metropolitan industrial centres, thus serving as a
replacement for the more coercive controls associated with Section 3 of
the Physical Planning Act. The new fiscal "disincentives", long a
source of anxiety within betropolitan business, have now become a focus
of a bitter and ongoing battle with state planners.
There are, finally, many in both organised industry and
commerce who remain sceptical about the workability of industrial
decentralisation - as our earlier quote from Oppenheimer illustrates.
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But the reception was not unmixed. Many statements of enthusiasm came
with reservations attached, and some top businessmen came out in open
criticism of the new scheme. One of these was longstanding critic Harry
Oppenheimer, who insisted that the post-1982 regional development plan
"requires to my mind a great deal more critical examination by the
business community than it has so far received". He asked whether the
plan was not the result in part of "doubtful political considerations"
and asserted that "as a general policy decentralisation is jusji as sure
to fail in its new form as it was in the time of Verwoerd ..."
Organised capital did not simply receive the Good Hope plan as
a fait accompli from state policymakers: it participated actively in
the formulation of the new regional development approach. In mid-1979
the FCI articulated its own policy on regional development in a document
which called for more substantial and permanent incentives to ameliorate
the plight of "immobile under-employed populations". It insisted that
decentralisation should draw on the overspill of national economic
growth. Decentralisation should compensate individual companies on the
basis of the "relative cost disability" of the sector and region to
which they belonged. Costs should in turn be borne by the state revenue
fund. The FCI was not speaking to deaf ears: in 1979 FCI executive
director H.J.J. Reynders, welcoming the Riekert report, praijsed the
government's greater willingness to solicit business opinion. The
executive director in 1980, J.C. van Zyl, affirmed that government
economic strategy was now "deliberately attuned to the needs of
business", ushering in "a new era of partnership". In this atmosphere
the government sought with interest organised capital's views on
industrial decentralisation, soliciting them from the late 1970s onwards
through ^uch bodies as the Development Strategy Committee on Black
States.
Similarly, organised commerce and industry were drawn directly
into the new regional policymaking organs, such as, for example, the
National Regional Development Advisory Council, the eight Regional
Development Advisory Committees (RDACs), the Small Business Development
Corporation, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).
Assocom encouraged its local chambers to enter new regional bodies, to
thereby "participate in the shaping of policy" and "stake claims for the
benefits that these policies might bring". In 1982 Assocom president
Gordon Stuart Reckling confirmed that his organisation was actively
participating in decentralisation bodies. The FCI has also
energetically involved itself in their operation. Two academics
critical of decentralisation have lamented that the private sector is
"immersed" in the state's new regional planning machinery.
Another index of the favourable response of many capitalists to
the Good Hope package has been the massive increase in industrial
investment in the growth points since 1982, principally, it would seem,
in response to the very favourable incentive package that the state is
offering. Investors have also reacted against growing black trade union
pressure in the major centres. Finally, the stagnation that has gripped
the South African economy has driven many firms to seek a means of
survival in state-subsidised (frequently oversubsidised) growth points,
leading to a notorious proliferation of lame duck companies propped up
by state ft^dsi a s well as - not surprisingly - to considerable
corruption.
Finally, organised industry endorsed, at least until about
1984, the constitutional initiatives of the Botha government and the
role assigned within those initiatives to regional development.
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While conceding that the Good Hope plan was the result of "many, many
months of careful and sincere study", a 1982 edition of Assocom Review
nonetheless cast doubt on whether decentralisation justified the time
and effort expended on it. Similar schemes had failed in Western
Europe; and "when the ultimate balance sheet is drawn" the "final
accounting line" shows that, in South Africa too, results had been
limited. Other expressions of doubt could be cited as well.
Industrial decentralisation, though designed by post-1948 policy-makers
to reconcile apartheid with capitalist development, and though
repeatedly re-shaped and modified to accommodate capitalist demands and
requirements, remains a less than preferred "compromise" for
manufacturing capitalists in the commanding heights of organised
industry (and their industrial and commercial counterparts in Assocom).
Ill
Let us begin our thematic discussion, then, by outlining
established industry's criticisms and the reasons for them, an
indispensable first step before going on to demonstrate the numerous
ambiguities in, and limits to, its opposition.
One can find many critical and sometimes quite hostile
statements from industry about industrial decentralisation. Perhaps the
bluntest came during a meeting of the Economic Advisory Council in i960,
the year in which the border industry programme formally got underway.
On the subject of decentralisation, the FCI reported afterwards:
The FCI standpoint was that we did not like it, that we did
not believe that industry should be tampered with, that we
have chosen the sites for our factories because we believed
these to be the most economical for our manufacture, and
therefore in the best interests of South Africa, and that
any artificial Government interference might have the effect
of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.
Though never averse to state intervention designed specifically to
promote its interests, industry quickly rediscovered the virtues of the
market whenever it perceived its interests to be threatened by
interventionist policies. Industrial decentralisation has, indeed,
provided a pretext to innumerable reaffirmations of faith by business in
free enterprise, which it has counterposed to "ideological" edicts
emanating from politicians. As early as 1936, FCI president S. Craig
Bain stated the following on the issue:
Industries have the same characteristic which is attributed
to money and water in that they inevitably and unrelaxingly
seek their own level and it is difficult, and in the main
unwise, to stop this functioning by artificial means.
"No planning authority", the Assocom executive declared in 1948 "could
hope to emulate the co-ordination achieved by individuals anxious^ to
achieve the most advantageous location for their several purposes.
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What is the basis of capital's criticisms? A number of themes
have occurred in organised industry and commerce's objections over the
years.
The first is anxiety about "unfair competition11. Industries in
established areas have frequently expressed the fear that their
competiive position would be undermined by new industries in the border
or reserve areas taking advantage of unlimited supplies of cheap,
typically non-unionised labour, exmpt in many cases, from the
determinations of wage boards and industrial councils. This fear has
been particularly acute in the clothing and footwear industries, where
high labour and low skill intensity have allowed a number of firms to
take advantage of cheap rural-based labour in "uncontrolled" areas.
This, combined with their special vulnerability to international
competition, has left clothing and footwear manufacturers in established
areas feeling doubly threatened.
Established industry has also feared unfair competition from
firms in decentralised areas enjoying artifical subsidies and exemptions
from certain Jtinds of apartheid restrictions (notably from job
reservations). The attitude of firms in metropolitan areas has
tended to be: either none of us suffer from apartheid-induced labour
shortages, or else we all do.
Established metropolitan industry has especially resented being
called upon to subsidise tftUis "unfair competition" against itself
through additional taxation. Industrialists have repeatedly warned
about the high costs of the decentralisation programme, especially where
it involves furnishing infrastructure and services in remote
"uneconomic" growth points. They have further worried that state
expenditure would gain an uncontrollable momentum of its own as more and
more decentralised firms scrambled for, or became lastingly dependent
upon, official subsidisation. These anxieties were underlined by
industry's conviction that South Africa suffered, virtually throughout
the post-war period, from shortages of both capital and labour, and that
the decentralisation programme, by drawing on available-supplies of
these resources, would exacerbate nation-wide scarcities.
Metropolitan industrialists argued that, between the, "unfair
competition" and the fiscal demands of decentralisation threatened to
raise the cost structure of established industry, dilute the benefits
of protective overseas trade policies (by generating competition
"from within"), and weaken industry's international competitiveness.
Metropolitan based industrialists also opposed any artificial
division of South Africa's economy into two or more discrete entities,
as separate development dictated. They preferred to see the bantustans
remain an open market to the products of industries situation in "white"
areas, especially in light of the small size of the domestic market.
Conversely, they doubted that any artificial parcelling-up of the
domestic market could insulate established metropolitan industry from
the "unfair competition" of bantustan or border industries, more
especially in the struggle for the growing black consumer market.
Organised industry, finally, disagreed with the state's
political rationale for industrial decentralisation in the pre-l980s
decades. It must be emphasised that manufacturing and commercial
capital strongly supported continued white political supremacy during
these years and repeatedly stressed this in discussions of industrial
decentralisation. It is furthermore quite clear that business looked
- and still looks - to the state to guarantee the political
preconditions for capital accumulation. However, industry and the
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state were at odds about how to realise these political and security
objectives in post-war South Africa. The state favoured separate
economic development as a guarantee of white political dominance,
whereas industry (and commerce) favoured gradual economic integration
and black material advancement within white designated areas alongside -
and reinforcing - white rule. These differences expressed themselves in
a fascinating way in arguments about industrial decentralisation.
According to the state, decentralisation would help to
safeguard white power by preventing the development of a black "cordon"
around white residentail areas. In addition, it would generate
political quiescence by allowing blacks to work in close proximity to
their homesteads and their traditional cultural and administrative
systems. Finally, it would secure the economy from being wiped out in a
quick nuclear attack aimed at the PWV and other main centres. While
sometimes conceding that rural industries could give blacks a "more
contented outlook" away from the "hothouse atmosphere of Native urban
life" organised industry on other occasions voiced clear disagreement
with the politico-strategic reasoning behind the state's industrial
decentralisation policy. It doubted whether whites were in fact in
danger of being swamped by black urbanisation and it feared the unstable
investment environment that could result from the actions of potentially
volatile black homeland leaders in bantustan and border areas.
The most striking instance of disagreement, however, was
expressed in 1960 in response to the state's claim that decentralisation
would make it easier to cope with either nuclear war or popular
rebellion. The FCI replied as follows:
[I]f it is visualised that the attack will take the form of
an atomic or hydrogen bomb, then dispersion would be
desirable, but if on the other hand .. . the attack [takes]
the form of a general internal upheaval then concentration
for defence in a few main centres would be the more
desirable ... [We] deem the possibility of internal attack
greater than that of external attack ... [W]e have no reason
to believe that the dispersion of the non-European
population will reduce ... rioting. In fact, if the widely
dispersed non-European people decide to riot in their
scattered communities, then the task of restoring law and
order; of defending persons and property and of controlling
the non-European masses will be all the more difficult and
costly. You can seal off a large native location and defend
thirty factories concentrated in one area with ten Saracen
vehicles, but you may need sixty or more such vehicles and a
correspondingly greater number of police and troops to
defend thirty scattered factories if the Native workers
employed in each of them go into a simultaneous riot.
Furthermore, dispersal of industry would i\pX prevent the black masses
from developing a political consciousness.
Why, however, did metropolitan industrialists so often view
decentralisation as a threat rather than as an opportunity? Why, for
example, did they not, as individual capitals themselves, seek to
relocate to the growth points so that they could precisely enjoy the
benefits of "unfair competition"? The chief reason appears to be
industry's heavy investment in metropolitan based fixed capital stock
Manufacturing Capital 19.
with long turnover times and the fear that this capacity could fall into
unprofitable dis-use through duplication on the periphery.
In addition, there were the "agglomeration economies'1 attached
to location in established areas: access to large markets, to pools
of skilled labour, to ^ transport, eletricity supplies, repair shops and
other infrastructure.
The advantages of locating in established areas were magnified
by the severe underdevelopment on t nfp R South African periphery
(especially in more remote growth points) and by the effects of a
railway rating policy that favoured processing of raw materials in
cities rather than at their rural sources.
In general capitalists - not only established ones - feared
anything that appeared to undermine their autonomy in making production
and investment decisions. This abridgement of autonomy could take
numerous forms: direct or indirect fiscal controls; ill-defined policy
measures and arbitrary administration of policy, resulting in an
uncertain investment environment and complicating business
decisionmaking; above all, capitalists "rigidly opposed" any. threat
of direct compulsion by the state to control location of firms.
IV
Thus far we have done no more than put on record the reasons
for established metropolitan industry's opposition (such as it was, or
is) to industrial decentralisation policies. While Lipton notes that
the policy "did not affect all employers equally" (p. 153) and alludes
to the vacillating stance of the Afrikaner Handelsinstituut {p. 154),
she is content to let matters stand as they have just been presented.
For her it is cut and dried: industry opposed decentralisation but
could do precious little about it. It is, as we have already suggested,
an analysis which (i) underestimates the degree of mutual accommodation
between organised industry and the state in respect of industrial
decentralisation, and (ii) overestimates the uniformity and clarity of
manufacturing capital's opposition to these policies.
Alongside its statements of opposition, for example, organised
industry and commerce have on many occasions expressed support for
industrial decentralisation "in principle" and have on a number of
occasions emphasised its importance in speeches and passed resolutions
calling for its active promotion by the state.
Organised capital has considered decentralisation desirable "in
principle" for a variety of unsurprising reasons: while
decentralisation imposed costs it clearly also offered benefits. Many
firms saw in decentralisation a means of reaping concessionary benefits
from the state; exploiting stabilised, super-cheap black labour; and
escaping both white trade unions and, from roughly 1973, black trade
unions in the metropolitan centres. Decentralisation policy's
potential longer-term benefits - bringing fresh resources into the field
of capitalist production, extending infrastructural facilities to
previously unproductive areas and politically stabilising regions with
large imobile populations - have also been intermittently recognised by
organised capital.
Moreover, at least some businessmen - especially in commerce -
seemed to regard fears of "unfair competition" from border or reserve
based industries as exaggerated. An important 1952 Assocom memorandum
J
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argued that "competitive forces would level up wage differentials"
between established and outlying areas; "no serious threat to the
welfare of urban industries is seen in the est -..>1 shment through private
investment, of new industries in the reserves"; a fall-off in direct
demand for certain goods manufactured in established areas would be
"made up by increased demand in other directions" - for example, for
building materials. Decentralisation of industry would raise the annual
rate of investment in South Africa as a whole.
Much of Assocom's criticism was directed not at the state's
attempts to promote decentralisation to underdeveloped areas, but, on
the contrary, at its attempts to close certain outlying regions off to
capitalist investment - and the state's benign neglect of certain other
regions which Assocom wished to see developed. Assocom condemned the
government's decision {prior to 1968) to place growth points almost
exclusively on the borders of the bantustans rather than encouraging
capital into other parts of the platteland or into the interior of
the reserves. While expressing the interests of Assocom's numerous
branches jn small white towns and inside bantustans like Transkei and
KwaZulu, this stance also reflected a perception that
industrialisation of the reserves was both a viable and desirable option
from the point of view of capital as a whole. There seems, Assocom
wrote in a 1952 memorandum, "a fair prospect of the establishment of a
substantial number of industries" in the reserves; however, state and
black capital, while necessary, would be insufficient to ensure such
development. Assocom therefore recommended that white capital "be
encouraged to play a considerable part" in developing the reserves.
If the reserves were ... thrown open to European enterprise,
the path would be opened for much industrial development,
and there seems little doubt that, by virtue of their
attractiveness from the aspect of labour supDlies,
substantial industrial development would take place.
In 1960 the president of Assocom emphasised again that "[t]hese
promising regions" - that is, the reserves - "are virtually excluded
from the field of investment by private enterprise. This is contrary to
one of the cardinal principles of the capitalist system". By the
later 1960s this had been included also in the FCI's litany of
grievances.
In 1968 the government acceded to these demands: it decided to
allow white capital into the reserves on the basis erf an "agency" system
similar to one prposed by FCI the previous year. Assocom, however,
soon began to call for the junking of the agency system - which required
that enterprises eventually be sold off to homeland development
corporations - in favour of a free and unfettered flow of capital into
the bantustans. This stronger demand was, in turn, recognised during
the course of the 1970s as "independent" bantustan leaders waived the
agency requirements.
Furthermore, FCI and Assocom did not regard state-provided
incentives simply as a cost: we have shown that from the late 1960s
onwards they came to regard decentralisation concessions as an
increasingly desirable benefit. Organised industry and commerce
frequently called for more, bigger and more durable incentives and
for the more,,, adequate furnishing of growth points with
infrastructure. This was especially so from roughly 1967 onwards. A
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1975 letter from the FCI executive director to the chairman of the Board
for Decentralisation of Industry offers an explicit list of areas where
industry sought improved incentives: housing loans for whites; tax
concessions on black wages; cash grants; tender preferences; road
transport exemptions; infrastructure; and others. There was not
universal agreement within FCI over the basis on which subsidies should
be provided, but throughout the 1970s the central thrust of FCI
demands was for more and still more official incentives.
Conversely, organised industry responded to improved government
incentives by showing an increased willingness to co-operate with
decentralisation policy. The only condition attached to demands for
incentives was that metropolitan based firms should not have to bear a
disproportionate part of the fiscal burden of subsidising them. This
condition the state has generally satisfied (although with the recently
introduced RSC levies organised capital has complained about having to
bear the brunt of fiscal disincentives in metropolitan areas).
The push for improved incentives was not confined to those
regions or factions of organised capital singled out for special benefit
(these we will examine later). Organised industry in various
established centres (which collectively dominated FCI) themselves began
to scramble, from 1960 onwards, for a slice of the benefits granted
under the decentralisation programme.
East and West Rand industrialists claimed their areas needed
special concessions to compensate for the exhaustion of gold mines.
Port Elizabeth industrialists argued that Port Elizabeth should itself
be seen as an underdeveloped area in need of special concessions, rather
than as a metropolitan area requiring deconcentration. The Cape
Chamber of Industries pleaded on a number of occasions in the late 1960s
for a coloured growth point to be established in the Western Cape and
called for the eniire Western Cape to be declared an "economic
development area". And the Natal Chamber of Industries, while
opposed to legislative compulsion, was quick to note possible
advantages for itself in the Physical Plann:mg Act (from whose most
severe provisions the province was exempted). In 1968 NCI president
R.C. Throssell indicated that while he did not like the constraints
which the Physical Planning Act placed on free enterprise, he considered
disastrous the over-concentration of industries drawing on the Vaal
River, and favoured their re-siting. The column is cynically headed
"Escape the Planning Act and Come to Natal!"
V
Organised industry and commerce did not, however, get drawn
into the logic of decentralisation policy entirely on the state's own
terms. They struggled fiercely over the terms of decentralisation
policy and policymaking. Their support was always conditional. To the
extent, in turn, that the state satisfied industry and commerce's
conditions, the latter's involvement in the decentralisation programme
tended to grow still more intimate.
In the first place, organised capital repeatedly^ demanded that
the state provide "continuous, regular and effective" channels for
consultation between policymakers and businessmen. Industry and
commerce did not want to be confronted by policy fait accompli; they
wished to be more than simply "advised of conclusions reached and the
J
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reasons therefore". Provided this demand was granted, the FCI and
Assocom were willing to co-operate with, inded participate directly in
implementing, the industrial decentralisation programme. The FCI, an
official declared in 1959, would support decentralisation if the
government "took organised industry into its confidence", made known the
"background and objec_tives" of its policy and took cognisance of
industry's "fears". This is what the state generally - and
increasingly - did.
The government set up the Economic Advisory Council in 1960 -
initially mainly as a means of granting organised industry (and,
incidentally, established unions) access to the decisionmaking machinery
of industrial decentralisation. Industry and commerce in turn used the
EAC to bargain over both decentralisation and more general economic
policy. The post-1971 decade saw consultation between organised capital
and decentralisation policy formers become still more "continuous,
regular and effective". In the 1980s a consciously reformist
administration boosted further direct capitalist participation in the
financing and implementation of regional planning.
The relationship between the state and organised capital thus
became less and less one between entirely external, discrete actors:
capital increasingly penetrated decentralisation-linked bodies. Formal
capitalist incorporation into decentralisation machinery has been part
of a wider process of "corporatist" participation in the state described
by Andre du Pisani. Indeed, capital's institutional participation
extends beyond decentralisation, embracing the whole gamut of economic
policy.
The power of these corporatist 'joint councils' and other
bodies should not be exaggerated, more especially in post-war South
Africa where capitalists (other than farmers) have had little direct
role in governing. Most corporatist bodies are essentially advisory and
offer the government a way of securing capitalist co-operation in
potentially contentious policy areas. But organised capital too has
derived benefits from such arrangements, and has perceived itself to do
so, even if in the process it sacrificed some of tis public freedom of
expression. Through its direct influence on the formulation and
application of decentralisation policy, for example, organised capital
has been able to constrain the arbitrary action of officialdom and
provide its members with clearer guides and pointers in making
locational decisions. It has also used its influence to temper
bureaucratic controls on locations and improve incentives and
infrastructure in growth points.
Whatever the precise extent of the power and authority of
corporatist mechanisms in the South African state, Raymond Parsons's
suggestion ,that business had, by the 1980s, become an "unpaid arm of
government" sits uneasily with the imagery - invoked by Greenberg and
Lipton - of an almost completely autonomous "racial state apparatus"
progressively severed, in the post-1948 decades, from any reference to
capitalist class interests.
Apart from demanding systematic and extensive consultation,
organised Industry and commerce attached a number of other provisos to
their support for industrial decentralisation. One was that the
decentralisation programme should be implemented in a gradual and
pragmatic way, if possible through controlled experiments in a
limited number of centres where facilities and industrial activity were
already present, and without blocking industrial growth in existing
metropolitan areas. Industrial decentralisation should be pursued as
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far as possible only in periods of economic growth. Another -
related - demand was that decentralisation policy should be "logical"
"natural" or "organic": that is, as far as possible tailored to "market
forces" and the requirements of capitalist profitability. Thus in
1966, the FCI affirmed that its approach to decentralisation was based
on a "philosophy of gradualism". It sought to "deal with the pattern of
industrial location as it is and as it may be modified, not as it might
be if we had a clean sheet of paper to write upon", Many similar
references could be cited. Implicit in these calls - and in the
demand for consultation - is of course a further proviso: that the
implementation of decentralisation policy should be free of the kind of
outright bureaucratic coercion which briefly threatened to become the
norm during the late 1960s.
These demands were, in general, taken serously by the state,
and most of them were met. The government repeatedly emphasised that,
in the words of Verwoerd, it "did not want to stop the economic
development of South Africa - not even for a period". What it sought to
do was "reconcile the economic and social needs of the country".
There would be - De Wet Nel emphasised in 1959 - no "revolutionary
transfer pf factories from the established centres to the peripheral
areas". Decentralisation would proceed "slowly and soundly".
Industrial development in established areas would not be brought to a
halt.16
The government launched the decentralisation programme after
almost a full decade of consultation and at least two commissions of
inquiry (three if we include Sauer). The programme commenced in 1960 on
the basis of a "rather feeble" package of incentives concentrated on
a small number of well placed growth points on the borders of the
reserves. Verwoerd stated the guiding principle in selecting growth
points in a 1954 speech:
A main criticism has been that it is not practical to
distribute industries all along the fringe of the reserves.
This is not a true description of my proposal. The true
position is that if there are areas in the proximity of the
reserves which comply with the special needs of industry,
they should attract the future development which we may
expect and hope for.
He emphasised again in a 1957 discussion that he did not have in mind
growth points "thousands of miles away from the existing centres" Jiut
rather substantial towns and even cities abutting the reserves.
After 1968 the state began to give assistance to a considerably wider
range of growth points in "white" South Africa and the bantustans, but
not all were granted equal attention; in the bantustans, for example,
only Isithebe, Butterworth and Babelegi received substantial state
investment. In the 1980s this selectivity was reinforced with the
renewed emphasis on "deconcentration points" near large urban centres.
The proliferation of areas receiving assistance since the 1960s, much
criticised by opponents of decentralisation, conceals a generally
cautious tendency to concentrate public investment in a small number of
centres.
Direct state coercion of capital in the course of implemeting
decentralisation was avoided until 1967. More importantly, the state
never enforced the Physical (later environment) Planning Act very
rigidly. The 1979 Rickert Commission advocated abolishing Section 3 of
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the Act in part because it was a manifest waste of manpower. Between
1972 and 1977, for example, fewer than 3% of applications for African
labour for factory extensions were refused. (This is not the same as
arguing that Section 3 did not frighten of bother investors.)
The state also sought, as far as possible, to use
decentralisation to boost the economy's long-term economic growth
prospects. In the first place, and as we have already suggested, the
post-1978 state saw decentralisation as one of the most - perhaps the
most - important instrument for reconciling its apartheid designs with
capitalist labour demands. Professor J.L. Sadie gave an explicit
explanation of the economic rationale for decentralisation in a 1957
speech: given the socio-political framework of separate development, he
said, decentralisation offered the most economically viable way of
pursuing various capitalist goals, including black occupational
specialisation and a reduction in the proportion of the workforce
engaged in migratory labour. Other advocates of decentralisation
believed it would boost black purchasing power and throw up a black
middle class.
The state envisaged industrial capital taking advantage of the
opportunities opened up by decentralisation in the context of an
evolving spatial division of labour between relatively more
capital-intensive and relatively more labour-intensive production
processes, with the former concentrating in the established urban
centres, the latter in new growth points. The advance of mechanisation
and the disaggregation of production processes into discrete, spatially
separable phases, were viewed as supplying the necessary preconditions
for this restructuring. (From 1969, however, the government also
began to encourage decentralisation by capital-intensive firms because
of their ability to attract supporting industries.)
Secondly, there were technocrats and politicians in the state
who appeared to genuinely believe that the costs of industrial
concentration in a small number of centres were mounting due to rising
land prices, congestion and, perhaps most importantly, due to shortages
of water. Other costs as well were attributed, not always as plausibly,
to overconcentration: these ranged from rising infrastructural and
service costs to high labour absenteeism _and turnover (due to illness
and the "social strains" of city life. The same technocrats and
politicians emphasised the need to bring into the field of capitalist
production unexploited sources of water and power (like the Tugela
Basin), underemployed and relatively immobile pools of labour (as in the
Eastern Cape and many bantustans) and other material resources locked up
in underdeveloped areas. They argued that doing so would raise
long-term productivity in the economy as a whole.
These arguments were, as we have shown, often (though not
always) disputed by organised industrialists and other businessmen in
the main centres. But their frequent employment does underline the
extent of the state's concern to accommodate the economic needs - and
class power - of capital. In addition, attempts by planners to justify
decentralisation on these grounds helped establish a common language of
reference in which officials and businessmen alike could argue over the
merits and demerits of particular decentralisation initiatives.
Still more importantly, the state's implementation of
decentralisation took account of, based itself upon, and sought to
reinforce certain spatial tendencies endogenous to capital itself. Two
such tendencies are discernible.
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The first was the tendency (from at least the 1940s onwards)
for capital to relocate to the periphery of urban centres in order to
escape the dis-economics of agglomeration in urban cores, principally
high land prices and congestion. This "suburbanisation" of industry was
underway by the 1940s - long before the decentralisation programme came
into effect - and was accompanied by a growing spatial division of
labour (between industrial, mining and tertiary activities) within the
metropolitan economies themselves. Manufacturing industry began to
concentrate in the East Rand, and in industrial satellite towns like
Bellville, Isando and Pinetown. When the border industry programme got
underway in the 1960s this suburbanisation was extended further afield,
with state assistance, to towns like Rosslyn, Brits, Pietermaritzburg
and Hammarsdale.
The second was a tendency in certain capitalist sectors to
relocate from the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area to other
relatively large centres (from at least the late 40s); and {from
roughly 1970) to invest in relatively more outlying areas. These latter
tendencies, identified Jy Bell, have affected mainly smaller and more
labour-intensive firms. There is by now a quite extensive literature
debating the relative weight of "spontaneous" and state-created
pressures in the decentralisation htat has occurred in recent
decades. This paper does not attempt any new contribution to this
discuss ion. I think, though, that Bell has successfully demonstrated
that certain kinds of decentralisation preceded the introduction of
state inducements, and that the acceleration of decentralisation from
the 1970s was, to a significant extent, propelled by "economic" factors
like intensifying international competition and growing union pressure
on wages in metropolitan centres. This does not at all exclude the
probability that positive and negative state incentives played a key
role in influencing capital location. From 1982 onwards they almost
certainly played a predominant role, though even in the latter period it
was the combination of very large official incentives with deepening
economic depression and labour strife in the main centres which seems to
have been decisive. Whereas downturns often appear to established
industry as particularly inopportune moments to pursue decentralisation,
they at the same time, and especially where incentives are high enough,
persuade many smaller and weaker firms to seek refuge, and a means of
survival, in highly subsidised and protected growth points.
This is not to say that therefore capital always favoured
policies to assist these "spontaneous" processes of industrial
dispersal. On the contrary, businessmen and economists often referred
to these as "organic" or "natural" processes of decentralisation which
required no additional state assistance.
But even if this is so - and the proposition remains debatable
- these correlations contradict the notion that the state has attempted
artificially to force the pace of decentralisation by driving industrial
capital solely into remote and unattractive locations. Nor is all this
to deny that there were other "spontaneous" spatial tendencies within
capital running counter to the objectives of decentralisation policy.
Were this not so, the volume of criticism directed at industrial
decentralisation from the commanding heights of organised
metropolitan-based industry would be unintelligible, as would the
consistent failure of decentralisation to reach the job-creation targets
of its architects, and the increased concentration of net output in
established industrial areas during the 1970s. But what this evidence
shows is the extent of the affinity between the practices of
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decentralisation policymakers and tendencies operative in certain
manufacturing sectors at particular times. At the very least it serves,
once more, to challenge Lipton's one-sided depiction of a radical
opposition between the interests of (virtually all) industrialists and
the spatial-economic projects of the apartheid state.
VI
Thus far we have tended to treat industry and commerce as
relatively homogeneous actors in the struggle over decentralisation
policy. But this was far from being so. There were organised factions
of capital which stood out in their strong and consistent support of
decentralisation. Capital, however, well organised, was and remains
inherently vulnerable to fracturing in the face of policies that
allocated incentives or disincentives on a spatially selective basis.
Firstly, industry itself is, despite its degree of concentration,
present in many scattered locations, some of them targeted as receiving
areas for decentralising industry; firms already established in these
areas could hope to benefit from incentives to expand, while firms
outside them are likely to view themselves as disadvantaged by the
absence of such incentives.
Secondly, firms display a high degree of variation in terms of
mobility and immobility; some are "footloose", others "space-bound".
Their ability to take advantage of incentives thus varies, with space-
bound firms self-evidently resistant to decentralisation (a diversity
for which the state has, however, made some allowance).
Thirdly, there is an inevitable difference of outlook between
established and new firms, the former clearly being more heavily
invested in locations outside the decentralisation points. The
hostility between the two is likely to be all the greater in "footloose"
sectors vulnerable to competition, as is the case in, say, clothing and
footwear.
Not surprisingly, given this potential for regional, sectoral
and intra-sectoral discord, there is a long history of tensions and
divisions within organised industry and commerce; these manifested
themselves in a whole variety of internecine conflicts.
The most well-known of these is between the AHI, on the one
hand, and FCI and Assocom on the other. Afrikaner firms have
historically been smaller, newer and - for very good strategic reasons -
loyal to the post-1948 ruling party. They have thus stood to gain more
from the patronage that the state dispensed through industrial
decentralisation and, indeed, there were complaints during the 1960s
about favouritism shown by the Permanent Committee for the Location of
Industry towards these firms (in the granting of incentives,
exemptions, etc). Not surprisingly, then, AHI has on the whole adopted
a more favourable stance towards decentralisation policy than its
counterparts elsewhere in commerce and indusirKy - though its support has
by no means been consistent or unambiguous.
But substantial divisions have manifested themselves also
within FCI and Assocom - divisions which predate 1948 and which have
continued to the present. These have mainly surfaced between different
regional chambers and branches, and began to manifest themselves as
early as the mid-l930s.
When called upon in 1939 to give evidence to the Rural
Industries Commission, the FCI executive committee decided not to do so
J
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on the grounds that the commission had already heard evidence from a
large number of individual manufacturers and constituent organisations
federated to the FCI. This evidence reflected a "purely local point of
view" which i± was "quite impossible for the National Organisation to
reconcile".
At the 1935 congress of Assocom delegates from inter alia,
Worcester and Uitenhage, pushed for policies to promote platteland
industry and criticised the lack of support from certain other
delegates, whom they accused of offering "sympathy without relief" which
was "like mustard without beef". The debate continued in Assocom the
following year, with pressure for industrial decentralisation poming
from towns like East London, Pietermaritzburg, and Kimberley. In
1937 an editorial in Commercial Opinion slated the sectionalism of
chambers of commerce based in small country towns:
Chambers of commerce are not merely associations of
businessmen formed to protect their purely local interests
... They each must be regarded as a link in the great chain
of organised.commerce, which ... has exercised an enormous
. --. loo
influence.
It was in deference to the Border, Pietermaritzburg and Northern
Transvaal chambers of industry that the FCI backed off, in 1960, from
outrightly opposing' measures to eliminate locational disadvantages in
particular areas.
At an FCI executive council meeting in 1965 a heated argument
broke out between representatives of metropolitan chambers of industry
and representatives of the Border and Pietermaritzburg chambers over the
merits of giving special assistance to firms in border areas. And in
a belligerent treatise (probably dated 1966), W. Essex Clark, a former
president of the Border Chamber, proposed that the Chamber withdraw from
the FCI because of the latter's unsympathetic stance towards East Cape
industries, and especially because of the FCI's reluctance to advocate
concessions for firms already established within border areas. "Our
hands," Clark complained, "are tied by our enforced adherence to FCI
unanimity on all such matters.":
In private discussions with Government we ask for special
treatment ... Yet in discussions at FCI meetings, or really
in public, we ask for little or nothing, or we assent to
measures making it difficult for Government to proceed with
measures beneficial to ourselves. In other words, we are
part of the voice of the FCI in cramping Border concessions.
To put it plainly, the President of the Border Chamber has
to wear two distinctive caps. One in public: "We oppose
concessions", and one in private: "We want special
concessions".
If on the other hand the Border Chamber pulled out of FCI it could
"shout (its) requirements and complaints from the housetops".
In a typical 1961 letter to Commercial Opinion, E.A. Weir of
Kiing William's Town, another Eastern Cape centre, defended border
industries policy as an attempt to offset the economic disadvantages of
investing in country towns, rather than giving them any unfair
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further afield stood to lose as capital leaving the
bypassed them in favour of border areas.
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competitive advantage. But the platteland itself was divided. While
businessmen in country towns adjacent to bantustans stood to gain from
the border industry scheme of the 1960s, those in platteland towns
main centres
Thus, while businessmen in
King Williams Town strongly backed the border industry scheme, as did
those in the Border region, it became a source of apprehension in
industrially ambitious country towns elsewhere in the Eastern and
Western Cape. The Orange
 qEree State also complained about the
overemphasis on border areas. There was thus no simple town-country
divide in the ranks of organised industry and commerce:
decentralisation policy generated more complex and intricate lines of
spatial fragmentation between groups of capitalists.
These fractures could undermine organised capital's solidarity
at crucial moments. In 1967, when organised industry and commerce
sought maximum unity in their desperate bid to torpedo the Physical
Planning Bill, the Northern Transvaal and Border chambers conspicuously
refused to ^Loin them in expressing opposition to the proposed
legislation. The Northern Transvaal Chamber's position was openly
disloyal. The Chamber did not, however, present its arguments in a
narrowly sectionalist way; it tried, for example, to construe the
Physical Planning Act as a wellspring of potential benefits for industry
in South Africa as a whole. Its "socio-economic advantages ... will
ultimately accrue to the entire Republic [creating] a more virile and
stable economy". The supposed advantages of locating in the proximity
of markets "obliterates the advantages of other locational factors",
unbalancing the economic structure and preventing full utilisation of
the nation's resources. Undue concentration would be a "violation of
all economic and social laws", creating strains and undue costs in a
number of sectors. The state, on the other hand, could ensure "advance
planning" with "long term benefits" instead of "haphazard development".
Criticism of the Planning Act was, the Northern Transvaal Chamber
suggested, akin to the unwarranted criticisms of Iscor during the
1920s,
abolition
The Northern Transvaal Chamber also opposed the proposed
of section 3 of the Physical Planning Act in the late
1970s. '~'
The Border Chamber of Industries too attempted to present its
sectional interests as coinciding with the interests of the nation as a
whole. In 1969 H.L. Phillips, then the Chamber's president, issued an
impassioned plea to the FCI to recognise the growth of Mdantsane
township as more than simply a local problem:
[I]s it not equally a national problem? Is it not in the
interests of the nation as a whole to ensure that one of the
principal harbours of the country is fully exploited to give
maximum employment to the vast body of Bantu labour at its
doorstep? Is it not in the interests of the nation to build
up the Border area industrially so that not only does it
cease to be a security and economic hazard, but develops
into a strong consumer market which could help to stimulate
the overall economy of the country?
He urged industrial rate elsewhere to show more sympathy for East
London's dificulties.
There is some indirect evidence that the tensions associated
with inter-regional competition continue to afflict industrial
decentralisation into the 1980s.
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Divisions over decentralisation within organised industry and
commerce also manifested themselves in prominent personality conflicts,
the most notorious of which centred on the person of Phillip Frame.
Frame, a strong advocate of decentralisation, established factories not
only in large centres but also in smaller or emerging centres like
Huguenot (in the Cape), Paarl, Pinetown, New Germany, Ladysmith,
Harrismith and still further afield in Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi*
Frame's maverick stand on decentralisation was apparent in a
1960 sitting of the Economic Advisory Council when he clashed with other
representatives of the FCI after proposing closing all factories in
established areas and converting them into cinemas! It seems
probable that the Frame Group's passion for industrial decentralisation
was linked, in turn, to its predilection for paying extremely low wages
to its black employees.
An outstanding advocate of decentralisation in Assocom was E.P.
Bradlow, an economist who headed both the Johannesburg Chamber of
Commerce and Assocom at various points in the 1960s. Bradlow, far from
being a government sympathiser, was more outspokenly opposed to influx
control during the 1960s than most representatives of employer
associations. But Bradlow believed that industrial decentralisation to
the reserves was essential, notwithstanding the origins of the policy in
an ideology of which he was critical. He also accepted that "racial
problems" made unconstrained rural-ruban migration an unrealistic option
in South Africa:
If, therefore, we do not want the Bantu to come to the
factories, we must bring the factories to the Bantu. In an
expanding economy many new industries will be required and
there is no reason why some of these should not be sited in
the Bantu homelands or territories adjacent to them. There
is in fact much to be said in favour of a policy which would
soften the impact of industrialisation on primitive people
by saving them
 Pthe hardships caused by separation from
family and home.
Instead, "the establishment of new industrial centres in the most
backward regions of the country" would help overcome, "outmoded
tribalism" and expose blacks to ''forces of modernisation".
On another occasion Bradlow stressed that industrial
development in the reserves would make possible a substantial increase
in black income, and help to distribute that income more evenly
throughout the country. Reserve industrialisation would also foster an
"African middle class" from which leaders of industry and commerce can
be drawn. Decentralisation, Bradlow argued in 1963, is being sought
throughout the world as a counter-weight to the problems of large
cities:
Few reasonable people will dispute that in South Africa much
suffering will be avoided if a part of our future
development can take place in the present reserves or
territories adjacent to them.
A "Herculean effort" was needed-to develop the reserves; this was a
matter of the "utmost urgency". Bradlow did have his reservations:
he felt that a policy of reseCjV& industrialisation required faster
growth in the economy as a whole; he also favoured the entry of
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white capital into the rserY_es; and finally he strongly opposed
compulsory location measures. But the overall tenor of his approach
to the state's decentralisation policy was indisputably positive.
VII
This article has argued that industrial decentralisation in
South Africa, far from being an ideological edifice unilaterally imposed
on industrial capital by the post-war state, has always been, and
remains, the outcome of a compromise between state and capital: a
compromise whose terms are constantly the object of struggle and
negotiation. This conception differs, firstly, from that of the
economistic and functionalist approaches associated with "revisionism"
in the 1970s. It differs insofar as it focuses on contingent struggle
between organised political agents, rather than simply on "structures"
and predetermined outcomes; and insofar as it accepts the state as an
entity in its own right, with its own interests, rather than as an
expression or instrument of forces located in the economy. As such, the
paper never assumes a static or uncontradictory correspondence between
capitalist interests and state behaviour. On the contrary it shows how,
in the case of industrial decentralisation, capital has faced policies
which it neither preferred over all other options, nor policies which
"objectively" sprung into being to serve its interests. They are
policies which, despite a variety of sources of origin, had become, by
the 1950s, closely associated with the political projects of the
post-1948 ruling groups - projects which were far from meeting
universal capitalist approval (at any rate in their "high" or "classic"
pre-1978 permutations).
But this paper also distances itself from the recent new
revisionism of Lipton and Greenberg. These two writers differ sharply
on manufacturing capital's relationship to apartheid. Greenberg sees
manufacturing capital as accommodating itself to apartheid with little
protest, while Lipton views manufacturing capital and the state as
having been in a virtually continuous state of conflict. But they share
in common the view that the post-1948 apartheid state was both
autonomous from capitalist class interests and, with some exceptions,
able to impose its will on those interests. Greenberg would have it
that manufacturing capital accepted this imposition lamely; Lipton
argues that it has struggled against apartheid but lacked the power to
prevail over it. But their theories of the state, to the extent that
they are articulated at all, appear basically similar: the state is a
juggernaut.
This paper, by contrast, argues that the state has had to
respect, and accommodate itself it, the power of capital. Capital's
"class power" is rooted in its control of crucial production and
investment decisions in the economy; and, more distantly, in the
structural reproduction requirements of the capitalist economy. The
governing groups have found themselves under continuous pressure to obey
the "economic laws" with whose supposedly inexorable logic capital has
confronted it. Moreover, the state is under pressure to accede to
capitalist needs in its own institutional self-interest. As people
living off politics, state power-holders need resources to finance their
projects and their own persons; as people who want to stay in power
they require the legitimacy that comes from a healthily functioning
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economy free of major disruption; as upholders of the "national
interest" they are typically unwilling to countenance a descent into
chaos. The state does not, therefore, hold all the cards: it has to
compromise and negotiate with capital to ensure a continuity of
production and investment. The South African state faces precisely
these imperatives - and has done so throughout the post-war period.
This paper has argued that industrial decentralisation
originated in part in the efforts of apartheid's social engineers to
reconcile the apartheid project with capitalist demands for an
unlimited, stabilised and occupationally mobile supply of black labour.
Further, the state has continually had to struggle over the terms of
this compromise and, in the course of that struggle, it has repeatedly
adapted its policies to manufacturing capital's demands. Further, it
has sought, as far as possible, to tailor its policy implementation to
trends and patterns already present in the capitalist economy, rather
than attempting any radically artificial restructuring of existing
spatial patterns.
The result, this paper shows at length, has been a pattern of
increasing capitalist accommodation to industrial decentralisation
policy. Drawn into the logic of these policies, organised industry
began demanding more and better incentives from the late 1960s onwards;
and it has become a corporate participant in the formulation and, more
importantly, the implementation of decentralisation policy.
Finally, the paper shows that many capitalists - in specific
firms, sectors, regions and political alignments - have themselves
openly favoured and fought for industrial decentralisation measures,
thereby dividing any actual or potential capitalist opposition to their
implementation.
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